





Activities and Causation, PSA 2002
Peter Machamer
Note:  None of my co-workshop colleagues have seen this draft of my paper, though Jim Bogen did see and comment on an earlier drfat.  In particular, I must apologize to Jim Woodward for his not receiving it earlier, though I believe, as is somewhat evident from his paper, that he knew what I would say anyway.

For purposes of understanding and doing science, it is best to conceive of the world as being onticly composed of entities and activities.  This is the dualistic position that we first put forth in Machamer Darden and Craver, "Thinking about Mechanisms"  (2000).  At that time we said
	Mechanisms are composed of both entities (with their properties) and activities. Activities are the producers of change. 
 Entities are the things that engage in activities. (MDC 2000, p. 3)

Subsequently we, or perhaps hereafter I should say "I" since I have not had time nor occasion to convince Darden and Craver to join me in detail, have made minor changes in the program, But not major ones.  About causality we claimed to follow Elizabeth Anscombe (MDC 2000; Anscombe 1971) in thinking of "cause" as basically syncategorimatic term like "good" (see Lycan and Machamer, 1971.)  Just as one cannot have, nor does one need a theory of "the good" tout court, equally one does not need a theory of cause per se.  The problem of causes is not to find general and adequate ontological or stipulative definition, but a problem of finding out, in any given case, what are the possible, plausible and actual causes at work in any given mechanism.  In our terms, it is discovering the entities and activities that comprise the mechanism.  That is, a scientist, and often us plain regular folk, seek to discover how things work by uncovering the mechanisms that make them work the way they do.  Uncovering mechanisms is finding about causes.  Particularly, discovering activities, the 'doing' parts of mechanisms, is the finding of causes.
	Now my colleagues, Darden and Craver, [e.g., Craver and Darden 2001, Darden and Craver 2002, Darden 2002, Craver 2002) have written as some length in various places about the strategies and processes of discovering mechanisms.  Darden and Craver (2002, pp. 21 ff.) are nicely explicit about the role of activities and productive continuity in discovery.  But here I wish to make different point. It seems clear to me that processes of, or strategies for, discovery are, if correct, epistemic principles.  They direct us in how to find out about the world, particularly how to find out about the mechanisms by which the world works. One strategy that they and others speak about is the process of intervention, whereby one blocks a putative activity to find out what happens.  Intervention is a good strategy for uncovering mechanisms or for finding causal connections.  Francis Bacon and John Stuart Mill thought so too, and many versions of statistical screening off, depend on intervention to bifurcate the relevant classes.  But this is clearly an epistemic or methodological principle (I will not make a distinction here), and I would have thought that only ontological (or even ontic) principles or descriptions belong in a "real" definition of causality.  Possible ideal interventions seem to fare no better in their claim to be fundamental ontology. One way to see this is to note that controlled intervention is an activity of a human researcher. Yet sometimes nature herself brings about an intervention, but any use to science is epistemic and only comes from a human recognizing it as such. The point of any intervention in experimental science is  that it is one of the techniques through which we may discover which of the possible activities and entities are really doing the work (or, if one prefers, to discover what the true cause is.)
	But let's turn back to activities and ask about their metaphysical status.  I am often unsure how to do metaphysics in ways that keeps it apart from epistemics.  But I would assume that any metaphysics that purports to get at ontology, or at some 'things' ontic status must answer questions about what are the criteria for identification for the 'thing" in question, and about why reference to that kind of "thing" is necessary in natural (including scientific) language.  Further, I presume something must be said about the relations the "thing" has to other "things" that are in the ontology, and specifically one must describe what kind of necessity attaches to that kind of "thing".  As I say maybe these are not the proper questions for a metaphysician to ask, but if they are not then I do not know what metaphysics is.
Now for activities, there are criteria that can be given for their identification.  We know how to pick out activities such as running bonding, flowing, etc.  But these criteria, like those for causes, are specific to the type of activity.  One might try to do something more general by giving the conditions for productive changes but then one would have to find out what all producings have in common, and by what are they differentiated from non-producings.  Now we can say something about the properties that activities have.  Darden and Craver (2002) mention such things as "rate, duration, strength, and sphere of influence".  From the fact that activities have measures that may be applied to them, and from the fact that they maybe identified independently of any particular entities that are acting, we might infer that they have some independent status.  Which is presumably what we want in order to attribute ontological status.  But I fear any too general characterization will be almost vacuous.  We could say activities are the happenings that, singularly or in concert with other activities, produce changes in entities and/or activities (where the entity may be the entity that is acting or one acted upon or both, or some set of other entities and activities.) But such talk seems quite unhelpful.  
Now I guess it needs to be said that not all activities are positive.  It may sound strange to talk about negative activities but in particular cases they are often found. Genes are expressed or fail to be expressed.  A protein binding to DNA, in some cases, will not allow transcription to proceed.  Remove the protein, and  transcription is unblocked. Mechanisms often rely on negative causal forces where something is absent, fails to occur, or is withdrawn.
Entities are perhaps onticly asymmetric with activities in one sense.  Entities are the things that act. So in this sense there is no activity without an entity.  But this is not to say that activities belong to entities in the same way the structural properties belong to entities.  It is to say that activities are how entities express themselves.  Activities show how entities are not just passive and in what ways they can be causal agents.  But even granting this asymmetry in most cases, it is not clear even that all activities are necessarily the activity of some entity, or, less strongly, that one can or needs to identify always an entity to which an activity belongs.  It is unclear to me that fields or energy are entities and not as it were substantial activities. Or that the process or activities of equilibrating or reaching stasis need entities in order to be understood. More complex and far reaching is a point about differential equations. The first law of thermodynamics says: dU=dQ-dW
where dU is the internal energy change.  So it is the change itself that is substantial​[1]​.  This may be the case for all differential equations insofar as they are supposed to describe or refer to continuous processes. 
One more short point, that I won't elaborate here. Activities can be abstracted and referred to and identified independently of any particular entity and sometimes, even without reference to any entity at all. So at least activities existing as abstract objects exist independently.
Process philosophers would have us define entities in terms of combining processes, but this seems a bit too strange.  So we, MDC, remain dualist.
Further, activities are better off ontologically than some people's ontic commitments to capacities, dispositions, tendencies or endeavors.  All these concepts are derivative from activities.  One can't specify a tendency or a capacity without having some way to identify what the capacity does when it is actualized or exercised.  But being able identify what a capacity does is identifying its behavior or the activity.  No identification of activity, no fixing of reference for an activity, then no possibility, even ideally, of defining capacities endeavors, etc.  I cannot have a concept of breakable if I have no concept of breaking.  One might think I can have breakable by having the concept broken and where broken just picks out the state that contrast, say the split apart object from the whole object.  But this would be too limited, for when we have the concept of breakable at least part of what we need is an idea of what conditions (described in terms of entities and activities) can produce the activity of breaking
Let me briefly talk now about that other great metaphysical term "necessity".  Necessity, as the great metaphysician Leibniz saw, comes by shutting off possibilities.  The only sense of necessity for causality, that most factitious of all concepts, should be some sort of physical necessity (whatever that means it does not mean the necessity of logic or of determinism.)  It was this sense of "necessity" that William Kneale sweated over, and C.J. Ducasse too.  Epistemically or methodologically, by experimentation or other means, one rules out possibilities that are at first promising or could be thought to be the cause in order to find out what causes are more probable.  Hopefully, then, after enough work one may discover what the actual cause is.  That actual cause then is necessary but only in the sense that since there are no other possibilities, then this must be the case.  If we have ruled out everything that is possible, the only thing that is left must be necessary.  (I here paraphrase Sherlock Holmes and Leibniz.)  Metaphysically activities are what do the ruling out, by connecting e.g., one entity to another entity or by producing a change in another entity.  In this way activities are like selective functions; they explain why the arrow in the cartoon diagram goes to this certain result or point rather than some other. (There may be a comparison here to Nuel Belnap's transition events, his arrows, but I have not had time to explore this possibility.)
Some people would have us get necessity by somehow adding conditions on the correlations or varying correlations.  It is well known that no degree of correlation between two entities will give rise to any form of necessity.  But the adding of conditions, like counterfactuals or isolating the variables that co-vary in their values, may be somehow sufficient to warrant some sort of necessity.  But even if that were true, and I am not sure it is, there still would be no explanation of the process by which the entities and activities did such things that resulted in that which was to be explained..
In a final point about ontology let me remark that activities are necessary for descriptions of the world given in natural languages. Natural languages need verbs, and some verbs refer to causes or activities.  In formal languages, verbs maybe eliminable in some sense (in favor of functions).  Canonical form eliminates verbs, and treats them as strange predicates.  But this seems to be equivalent to turning all verbs in property like capacities, and I have argued against the sufficiency of that above. only derivatively by turning verbs into.  Further, taking functions as ontologically basic would be, I think, even weirder ontology than activities.  Logic then wood have become metaphysics.

Epistemology of activities
We should talk now about the epistemology of activities.  Part of this comes from an earlier draft of a paper I am working on with Jackie Sullivan, "Leveling Reduction".
People learn to pick out and categorize activities as well as they do entities, and independently.  All language users need to learn what verbs mean and how to attribute activities to entities.  (Tomasello and Merriman 1995, pp. 1-18)  Referents of verbs (activities or, often, human actions) are taken by young children as being categories in very much the same way objects are.  People, including children, categorize the world into running, breaking, bonding just as they do into flowers, bears and bootstraps. The asymmetry point spoken of above is relevant here again.  In most cases, it is always some thing that is involved in an activity, whereas we often assume that we may pick out things without also picking out activities.  (but if picking out depends upon successful perception, in any sense, this may be profoundly untrue.  See below.)  However, activities, since they may be instantiated by many different individual things and often even kinds of things, must be identifiable independently of the individual entities that are acting.  The upshot of this view of verb learning is that learning verbs is independent of learning nouns, and each must be treated distinctly.  This is then epistemic independence.  
An argument for epistemic priority might be given by arguing that object permanence is only learned through grasping and object control.  So the very idea of a static, permanent object is dependent upon sensori-motor skills, which are in themselves activities.  So a child must first develop the requisite sensori-motor skills before acquiring any concept of object permanence. (Cf. Piaget, Child’s Conception of the World).  Further, in developing these sensori-motor skills the child is developing knowledge of what activities are. This aspect of activity learning is procedural learning, where what is learned is how to do something or how to properly or effectively act.  Most sensori-motor knowledge is of this form.  There is no nominalized (propositional) version of this type of knowledge.  In fact, very often this form of knowledge is not available to consciousness and cannot be given explicitly in any verbal form. (Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1995?) 
Further, children often learn what objects do before they learn what objects are.  That is, in the early stages of development, children develop sensory-motor skills by engaging in activities with objects and in so doing, they gain some knowledge of cause and effect relations.  They learn what objects do.  Some of this learning is prior to their learning a language.  To borrow a classic example from Piaget, children learn to play a form of Peek-a Boo noticing the activities before they have any concept of object permanence.
Perception of activities is as fundamental (if not more so) than perception of objects or entities.  Perception of causality is a good example. J. J. Gibson (1966, 1980; following Michotte and like Gunar Johanssen ) has argued that people perceive events more fundamentally than objects.  In fact, Gibson has argued that perception of change is our most fundamental perceptual ability.  (Cf. Gibson 1966, and Machamer 1975).  The absolute character of the necessity of change for perception or of perceiving activities (as we would say) is that if anything is truly static, and neither perceiver nor entity is moving, then perception in impossible.  Perception is impossible when retinal images become stabilized.  It is by only moving signals across the retinal cells that they become activated.  No activity, no cellular activation, no perception​[2]​. 
Change in the world of a perceiver is the activities resulting from changing interactions between perceiver and environment.  Continuous reciprocal activity is what is basic for our ability to know the world and to act in that world.  We have too long been misled by passive pictures regarding the fundamental epistemic processes of perception and, one might add, cognition. Even knowledge, it might be well argued but not here, is not passive, knowledge representations are not static traces deposited by incoming signals, but are active representations that must include activities on the part of the knower (as fundamental and ineliminable.) (Machamer and Osbeck 20002 a, 2002b) That is, knowing is in a major part acting.  Further, perceivers most fundamental abilities are those determined by the ecologically salient categories that they learn to discriminate by acting in the world. (Gibson 1979)
There is another argument that is based on the epistemic salience of causal structures.  Verbal structures, especially causal verbal structures are as important if not more important for learning and comprehension than are nominalizations. (Kintsch, 1986, 1992) Kintch's studies of reading comprehension tasks have shown that readers attend to causal verbs in the passages they read, which they then use to construct their internal (situation) model of what happened.  This model subsequently is accessed during recall data. Which is what is used to test comprehension. .  Interestingly, it has been noted that how well (accurately) a reader recalls a text depends upon the coherency of the situation model constructed, and this is measured by how well the causal connections in the text are represented in the model. Specifically, the syntax of the written sentence, particularly the syntax involving verbal structures provides cues to the reader as to what are the important causal relations in a text.  (p. 2) Readers use active knowledge based schemata as the basis for constructing situation models about what they read.  Specific people, events or names usually play a secondary role and are filled in only when the causal schema is recalled.
Similarly in learning, studies on children's learning of history texts show they tend to recall what they have learned better when the text is written using of active causal verbs, then when the same events are described by relevantly similar adjectives and the verb "to be".  
In both cases, active causal verbs are more effective and important for learning and recall than are nouns that might do the "same descriptive jobs".  Causal verbs are used to construct schemata or frames, which are then used to access prior knowledge representations of similar situations.  Causal verb schemata are what we have been calling types of activities.  This suggests that people attend identify and categorize activities in a fundamental way.
Finally, let me look at Jim Woodward's allolactase case (Woodward 2002) which is one case he says shows the insufficiency of the MDC approach, and presumably the insufficiency of using activities to talk about causality. This is a case where the inducer, allolactase, initiates transcription by interfering with the operation of an agent that prevents transcription.  He claims that MDC cannot "capture the idea that there is an overall all productive relationship without explicitly invoking the idea of a counterfactual dependence." (S372)  Further, he says, we cannot plausibly say that the overall relationship is spelled out by showing that the relationship between X and Y is productive if X is connected to Y via series of intermediate steps each of which correspond to an activity of MDC's list." (S372-3)  The reason is it implausible, he says, is that "causation (and production) is not transitive."  (footnote, S373)
But who ever said that activities that comprise the transitions between steps obey the laws of transitivity.  Many, if not most, transitive verbs are not transitive. But who cares?  What one wants to do is establishing and displaying mechanism is to show how one stage produces the next, and so on.  The activities with their associated entities are what do the producing.  The causality lies in the production.  The steps are the activities that connect the stages; the activities are what do the producing.  These need not be transitive. 
Many examples that people use to talk about causation (and/or explanation) do not clearly seem to be about mechanisms.  In MDC we confined ourselves to biology and neuroscience, but we hinted at expansion.  I, M, (and here I do not speak for D &C) think it can and ought to be extended even to the common sense or ordinary type of cases that dot the landscape of the causal literature.  As noted above in history texts and stories, one looks for causative verbs to construct models of what is happening.  This is the way we make world intelligible.  Narratives most often are stories made up of mechanism or mechanism schemata descriptions.  The failure of Fergus to arrive at the party sent Tara into a funk, whereupon, somewhat later in the evening, she sold the ring that Fergus had bought her bought a gun, and went to Fergus' home and shot him dead.  So shall we say there is mechanism that explains why Fergus' absence caused Fergus' death?  Yes, I say.  Did younot understand the tale I just told.  How did you do so? Mechanism schemata abound in this small story.  They are the mechanisms that explain why people act the way they do, and why Tara funked, sold, bought and shot.  This isn't science, but it is the stuff that great literature is made of, though not so in Tara's case.  But explaining why these narratives are best thought of as mechanisms is a longer and more detailed story.
Finally, in MDC we said that mechanisms (and functions) are sought after in a context.  That is, they have teleological component, and usually (but not always) the scientist knows what it is that wants to be explained. Relevant mechanisms for doing the explaining will be different depending on what the explanation is for. Or again, identification of mechanisms is purpose relative.  It may be relative to the event, state or termination conditions, or it may have larger context dependence even of the scientists conception of what science is.  This is a broadening of Van Fraassen's contrast classes. If a biologist or another scientist is interested in control or manipulation, and many of them are, then this is an epistemic goal for that biologist's doing science.  It is an important goal, and it is important to learn how to intervene and manipulate in experimental settings. Much a scientific training and subsequent practice is involves pursuing that goal.  But having these as goals for one's science and scientific practice is not the same as finding a mechanism, nor is it the same as explaining things by mechanisms.  In fact, controlling is not explaining at all.
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^1	  Halliday and Resnik (1986) write interestingly in a footnote describing the first law of thermodynamics: "Here dQ and dW, unlike, dU are not real differentials.  There are, for example, no such functions as Q(p,v) or W(p.v)) because Q and W refer to transitions between states of system and not to the states themselves. dQ and dW are called inexact differentials…" 9p.396)
^2	  There may be a deep point to be made here.  It may be that change or activity is both epistemically and ontologically fundamental to our knowledge.  This could parallel what was said about fundamental equations being differentials that describe continuous processes.  In its turn this could be used as basis for an argument that becoming precedes being.  But this idea certainly is too ponderous to lift here.
